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在由一个供应商和一个销售商构成的二级供应链,假设市场需求受到销售商的促销努力水平的影响,销售季节到来之前,销售商根据促销成本和收益决定最优促销努力水平和订货量。在促销成本不可观测时,利用委托代理理论研究信息不对称时如何通过回购契约揭示真实的促销努力成本。研究结果表明销售商有动机将努力促销成本报高,为了吸引销售商显示真实的促销努力成本,供应商必须付出额外的信息租金,随促销成本增大,销售商通过虚报高成本获得的利润减小,故需要揭示真实成本信息所付出的信息租金随之减小。由于信息租金的付出,导致了非效率现象的产生,使得销售商的最优订货量和促销努力水平均小于完全信息下系统的最优水平,只能得到帕累托改进的次优结果。
In a two-level supply chain consisting of a supplier and a seller, the market demand is influenced by the sales promotion efforts of the seller. Before the sales season, the seller decides the optimal promotion effort and the order quantity according to the promotion cost and revenue . When the promotion cost can not be observed, this paper uses the principal-agent theory to study how the real promotional efforts cost can be revealed through the repurchase contract when the information asymmetry. The results show that the seller is motivated to work hard at the high cost of sales promotion. In order to attract the seller to show the real cost of promotional efforts, the supplier must pay extra rent for the information. As the promotional cost increases, the seller profits through the false high cost Small, so need to reveal the real cost of information to pay the rent reduced. Due to the information rent, the non-efficiency phenomenon leads to the optimal ordering quantity and promotion effort of the seller less than the optimal level of the system under complete information, and only the inferior result of Pareto improvement can be obtained.