论文部分内容阅读
本文在委托代理理论的分析框架下,着重运用高层梯队理论,以我国2008-2012年上市公司为样本,考察了董事长既有任期、预期任期对投资挤占的影响。研究发现:董事长既有任期、预期任期与公司整体投资水平均呈显著正相关;董事长既有任期与投资挤占呈显著正相关;董事长预期任期与投资挤占呈显著负相关;股权制衡在董事长既有任期影响投资挤占中起到了缓解作用,但在董事长预期任期影响投资挤占中尚未起到调节作用。进一步区分产权性质发现,在国有和非国有公司中,不同既有任期、预期任期的董事长对各类别投资、投资挤占的影响以及股权制衡对上述关系的调节作用均存在差异。这些研究结论对于深入理解企业的投资行为,以及加强人力资源管理都具有一定的启示意义。
Under the framework of the principal-agent theory, this paper focuses on the use of high-rise echelon theory and takes the listed companies in China from 2008 to 2012 as samples to examine the impact of the chairman’s term of office and expected tenure on investment crowding. The study found that chairman of the board has both tenure and expected tenure as a positive correlation with the overall investment level of the company. There is a significant positive correlation between the tenure of chairman and the investment crowding up. Chairman of the board of directors expected tenure and investment crowding is negatively correlated; The chairman of the board has played a mitigating role both in term of office and investment crowding, but it has not yet played a regulatory role in the expectation that the term of office of the chairman will affect the investment crowding-in. Further distinguishing the nature of the property rights found that among the state-owned and non-state-owned companies, the influence of the chairman of the board on different types of investment and investment crowding, as well as the regulatory role of equity checks and balances on the above relationships, are different among the state-owned and non-state-owned companies. These findings have certain enlightenment for understanding corporate investment behavior and strengthening human resources management.