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在全球经济低碳化的大背景下,我国经济迅猛发展并转型,众多成长型企业既有环境改进投资的激励,又必然会展开市场占有率博弈。文章通过建立一个企业投资的博弈模型,分析得出由于外部性和收益率的不同,企业的不同投资激励存在很大差异。在短期预算约束下,企业出于自身效用最大化的考虑,往往更注重短期直接收益,导致环境改进投资与社会福利最优存在一定的偏差,从而使经济发展的可持续性和稳定性下降。而在政府政策引导的同时,通过公众参与、选择和舆论监督,可以对企业的投资选择施加有效影响,达到促进低碳经济发展,提高整体经济效率的目的。
Against the backdrop of a low-carbon economy in the world, China’s economy is rapidly developing and transforming. As many growth-oriented enterprises are encouraged by the environment to improve their investment, they are bound to start a game of market share. Through establishing a game model of enterprise investment, the article draws a conclusion that due to the difference of externalities and profit rate, there are great differences in different investment incentives. Under the constraints of short-term budget, for the sake of maximizing their own utility, enterprises tend to pay more attention to short-term direct benefits, leading to some deviation between environmental improvement investment and optimal social welfare, thus reducing the sustainability and stability of economic development. However, while government policy guides, public participation, selection and supervision by public opinion can exert effective influence on the investment choices of enterprises and achieve the purpose of promoting the development of low-carbon economy and improving the overall economic efficiency.