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“现实性”范式是马克思与黑格尔哲学之争的关键。在马克思看来,黑格尔将“现实性”与“普通经验世界的定在”相区别,从而提出了一种有别于传统哲学的“现实性”概念。其内涵是,以实体的抽象形式去先行规定现实世界的丰富内容,并由此演绎出以国家的普遍目的去预设市民社会本质的先验法哲学。马克思认为,黑格尔因为颠倒了“本质”领域与“现实性”领域的真正关系,而他辩证法的“交互-中介”特性却又无法调和两极间的根本对立,这就造成了黑格尔“现实性”概念的本质缺陷。恩格斯虽然把握了黑格尔“现实性”是一个辩证运动的过程,但他却把黑格尔的辩证法错误理解为某类线性知识发展观和自然科学式的渐进真理。实际上,黑格尔提出了一种不同于自近代笛卡尔以来的自然科学和几何学式线性认知论的真理观——圆圈式的认识论。真理的理念作为一个在历史中让精神不断自我显现的过程,构成了历史与认识之间的螺旋上升和循环。黑格尔的本体论虽然加入辩证法的否定性因素,但是其内涵依然是本质决定论,但他的知识论却以反向运动的过程来揭示本体论的能动性,正是通过这样一种结合了自己本体论与知识论正反运动的双向进程,黑格尔已经不再是马克思所批判的那种意义上的实体决定论。
The Paradigm of “Reality” is the Key to the Conflict of Philosophy between Marx and Hegel. In Marx’s view, Hegel distinguishes “reality ” from “the ordinary empirical world ”, and proposes a concept of “reality ” that is different from traditional philosophy. Its connotation is that the abstract content of the entity should be used to prescribe the rich content of the real world and deduce the transcendental philosophy of law which presupposes the nature of civil society with the universal purpose of the state. Marx thinks Hegel can not reconcile the fundamental antagonism between the two polarities because of reversing the true relationship between the field of “essence ” and the field of “reality ” It has caused the inherent flaws of the concept of Hegel’s “reality”. Although Engels grasped Hegel’s “reality” as a process of dialectical movement, he misunderstood Hegel’s dialectic as a progressive truth of a certain kind of linear knowledge development view and natural science. In fact, Hegel presents a circular epistemology that differs from the linear science of natural science and geometry since modern Descartes. The concept of truth as a process of letting the spirit constantly manifest itself in history constitutes a spiral and cycle between history and understanding. Although Hegel’s ontology has joined the negative factor of dialectics, its connotation is still essential determinism. However, his epistemology reveals the motivation of ontology by the process of reverse movement. It is through such a combination of Hegel’s two-way process of positive and negative movement of ontology and epistemology is no longer the substantive determinism that Marx criticizes.