本文试图从集体行动的逻辑出发,以案例研究为突破点来考察中国政治集团在应对危机时的脆弱性,认为中国的政治系统在组织规模、异质程度以及选择性激励与制度性激励的二元变奏三个方面都不符合集体行动的逻辑,本文以此为出发点,探讨了中国大国治理的转型,认为中国须以制度性激励为支撑,由组织化治理向风险治理转变。 This article attempts to proceed from the logic of collective action and take the case study as a breakthrough point to examine the fragility of Chinese political groups in response to the crisis. They think that the political system of China is not only in terms of organizational scale, heterogeneity, and selective incentives and institutional incentives This article takes this as the starting point, explores the transformation of the governance of the great powers in China, holds that China must take the institutional incentives as the support and the organizational governance to the risk governance changes.