歧视现象广泛存在于各种类型的组织中,但经济学家一直未能就其合理性做出令人满意的解释。在本文中,我们采用一个简单的锦标赛模型指出了组织中歧视的作用在于有效地防范合谋。我们证明了带有显性歧视的不对称机制优于无歧视的对称机制。进一步地,通过引入委托人对信息的操纵,我们揭示了隐性的歧视机制的作用,并且证明了它优于显性的歧视机制。 Discrimination is widespread in all kinds of organizations, but economists have failed to satisfactorily explain their justification. In this article, we use a simple tournament model to point out that the role of discrimination in organizations is to effectively prevent collusion. We show that the asymmetric mechanism with explicit discrimination is superior to the non-discriminatory symmetry mechanism. Further, by introducing the client's manipulation of information, we have uncovered the role of implicit discrimination mechanisms and demonstrated its superiority to the dominant discriminatory mechanism.