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中国的财政分权和政治集权相结合的体制对改革以来地方政府的城市偏向政策有重要影响。由于政府间转移支付的缺陷、中央的政治压力与县乡基层政府在“三农”问题中的重要角色,财政分权有利于减轻城市偏向。基于1994～2006年省级数据发现,省级财政独立性和省内支出分权都显著增加了财政农业支出尤其是支援农村生产支出,省级与区(县)级财政独立性缩小了城乡收入差距,但省内支出分权扩大了收入差距。这些结果表明财政分权总体上有利于缓解城市偏向程度,也提醒我们注意中国的转移支付的缺陷和县乡基层政府在解决“三农”问题中的重要地位。
The combination of fiscal decentralization and political centralization in China has had a significant impact on the urban biased policies of local governments since the reform began. Due to the defects of inter-governmental transfer payment, the central government’s political pressure and the important role played by the grass-roots government of county and township in the “three rural issues”, fiscal decentralization helps to reduce the urban bias. Based on the provincial data from 1994 to 2006, it is found that provincial fiscal independence and provincial decentralization have significantly increased fiscal expenditure on agriculture, especially supporting rural production expenditures, and provincial and district (county) fiscal independence has narrowed the urban-rural income However, decentralization of expenditures in the province has widened the income gap. These results show that fiscal decentralization is generally conducive to alleviating the urban bias and reminding us of the defects of China’s transfer payments and the important role of the county and township governments in solving the “three rural issues.”