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１９３５年９月至１９３６年底，日本外务省和关东军向国民政府要求两国在华北实施“共同防共”。本文探讨了日本要求与中国实施华北“共同防共”的真实意图，重点分析了国民政府针对日本要求的“共同防共”所采取的各项政策措施。认为：日本之所以要与中国实施华北“共同防共”，是想以“共同防共”为借口，推动华北“自治”的实现和阻止国民政府中央军北上；同时还想以此诱导中日结盟，隔断中苏联系，阻止红军向华北发展。针对日本的这些意图，国民政府一方面拒绝实施“共同防共”，另一方面加强了与苏联的沟通和联系，并相机控制绥远。此外，在对共产党和红军实行武力围剿的同时，也将以政治手段解决共产党问题提上议事日程。这些政策措施说明西安事变前国民政府因华北“共同防共”问题的提出，对苏政策、对共产党政策和对日政策都出现了值得重视的变化。
From September 1935 to the end of 1936, the Japanese Foreign Ministry and the Kwantung Army demanded from the National Government that the two countries implement “common prevention of communism” in North China. This article explores the true intentions of Japan calling for China to implement “common prevention of communism” in North China and focuses on various policies and measures adopted by the Kuomintang government in response to Japan’s demand for “common prevention of communism.” He believes that the reason why Japan wants to implement “joint prevention of communism” with China is to use “common prevention of communism” as an excuse to promote the realization of “autonomy” in North China and prevent the national government from going northwards. At the same time, it wants to induce the alliance between China and Japan, Cut off the Sino-Soviet ties and prevented the Red Army from developing to North China. In response to these Japanese intentions, the national government refused to implement “joint prevention of communism” on the one hand, and strengthened communication and liaison with the Soviet Union on the other, and the camera controlled Suiyuan. In addition, while carrying out the suppression of the Communist Party and the Red Army by force, it will put political issues on solving the Communist issue on the agenda. These policy measures show that before the Xi’an Incident, the National Government proposed the issue of “joint prevention of commonalities” in North China. Both the Soviet policy and the Communist policy and the policy towards Japan have brought about the changes that deserve due attention.