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文章基于中国民营企业控制权结构下的地方政府干预动机,利用中国民营上市公司的经验数据,从理论和实证两个层面系统研究了政府干预对民营上市公司雇佣行为的影响和控股股东控制权对政府这种干预行为的影响及其经济后果。结果发现:(1)控股股东的控制权会调节政府干预与民营企业雇员规模之间的关系,在控股股东控制权较大的民营企业中,交易成本或谈判成本更低,政府干预能够显著提高企业的雇员规模。(2)这种干预行为降低了民营企业雇员的配置效率,导致了企业劳动力成本的上升,也提高了雇员冗余的程度。文章研究在一定程度上为进一步了解地方政府对企业的干预机制提供了理论依据和决策参考。
Based on the motivation of local government intervention under the control structure of private-owned enterprises in China, this paper systematically studies the influence of government intervention on the hiring behavior of private listed companies and the controlling shareholder’s right of control based on the empirical data of private listed companies in China. The impact of government interventions and their economic consequences. The results show that: (1) Controlling shareholder’s controlling power will regulate the relationship between government intervention and the size of private-owned enterprises. In the private-owned enterprises with more control over controlling shareholders, transaction costs or negotiation costs are lower, government intervention can be significantly improved Employee size. (2) This kind of intervention reduces the disposition efficiency of employees in private enterprises, resulting in the increase of labor costs of enterprises and the degree of employee redundancy. To some extent, the study of the article provides a theoretical basis and decision-making reference for further understanding of the intervention mechanism of local government to enterprises.