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作为政治博弈的基本规则,政治制度决定了政治行为体战略选择的范围以及相互作用的结果。随着国际贸易所带来的经济发展和人均收入的增长,威权政体会面对不断扩大的政治参与需求。由于在不同的政治制度下战略选择集合的差异,当初始威权类型为军人政权时国际贸易更容易推动民主转型,而初始威权类型为一党制政权时国际贸易难以推动民主转型。对1945年至2010年威权政体变迁数据库进行计量分析的结果表明,参与国际贸易本身与民主转型并无显著的正相关效应;当纳入与初始威权类型的交互项,在同一贸易额、贸易开放度或出口依赖度时,相较于一党制政权,军人政权有更大的可能性发生民主转型。在相关关系的基础上,韩国和新加坡的比较案例分析揭示了初始威权类型作为条件变量的因果机制。作为军人政权,韩国朴正熙—全斗焕政府在面对劳工运动时倾向于实施刚性的强制手段且难以与反对派开展合作,故在冲击中更为脆弱。作为一党制政权,新加坡人民行动党政府则更善于使用柔性的强制手段并采取包容战略来满足劳工的参政需求,在开放贸易条件下更能保持稳定。
As the basic rule of the political game, the political system determines the scope of the strategic choices of the political actors and the result of the interaction. With the economic development brought by international trade and the growth of per capita income, authoritarian regimes will face the ever-expanding demand for political participation. Due to the differences in the set of strategic choices under different political systems, it is easier for international trade to promote democratic transition when the initial type of authoritarian power is a military regime. However, it is difficult for international trade to promote democratic transition when the initial type of authoritarianism is a one-party system. The results of the econometric analysis of the database of authoritarian regime changes from 1945 to 2010 show that participation in international trade has no significant positive correlation with the democratic transition. When the interaction terms with the initial types of authoritarianism are included, the same trade volume, trade openness Or export dependency, the military regime has a greater chance of democratic transition than one-party regimes. Based on the correlation, a comparative case study between Korea and Singapore reveals the causal mechanism of the initial authoritarian type as a conditional variable. As a military regime, the South Korean Park Chung-hee-all-Douhun government, in the face of the labor movement, tended to implement rigid coercive measures and was hard pressed to cooperate with the opposition and was therefore more vulnerable to the impact. As a one-party government, the PAPA government is even better at using flexible coercive measures and adopting an inclusive strategy to meet the labor demand for political participation and to be more stable under open trade conditions.