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分析一个供应商和n个Bertrand竞争零售商组成的供应链系统的协调问题.首先证明收益共享合约在稳定条件下能实现该供应链协调;当突发事件导致零售商面临的需求规模和供应商的生产成本同时发生扰动时,供应链的协调被打破,通过求解突发事件下供应链系统最优利润的Kuhn-Tucker(KT)条件,提出了供应链在一体化时应对突发事件的最优策略;进一步证明了改进的收益共享合约可协调需求和成本同时扰动的分权供应链;最后数值实验表明了模型的有效性.
This paper analyzes the coordination problem of a supply chain system composed of one supplier and n Bertrand competing retailers.First, it is proved that the revenue sharing contract can achieve the supply chain coordination under stable conditions; when the emergency causes the demand scale and the suppliers The coordination of the supply chain is broken. The Kuhn-Tucker (KT) condition of the optimal profit of the supply chain system under emergencies is put forward, and the optimal response to emergencies when the supply chain is integrated It also proves that the improved revenue-sharing contract can coordinate the supply chain with the disturbances of demand and cost. Finally, the numerical experiments show the effectiveness of the model.