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分析了中国航空市场的特点,以定义不同票价等级下各航空公司所提供的座位数为决策变量,舱位容量为约束条件,各家航空公司收益最大化为多目标函数,构建竞争环境下中国航空公司舱位控制的博弈模型,利用拉格朗日乘数法求解各航空公司最优低价票数,并以此来确定均衡舱位。仿真试验表明:各家航空公司舱位控制策略相互制约且能够达到均衡状态,但受到旅客需求随机性的影响,在12 000次的仿真试验中达到均衡的概率为12.68%,达不到均衡的概率为87.32%,因此,这种均衡是动态的且实现机率较低,结论与实际相符,模型切实可行。
This paper analyzes the characteristics of China’s aviation market to define the number of seats provided by airlines under different fare levels as decision variables and accommodation capacity as constraints and maximize the returns of various airlines as a multi-objective function to build a competitive environment in China Airline class control game model, the use of Lagrange multiplier method to solve the best low-cost airline votes, and in order to determine the equilibrium class. The simulation results show that the accommodation control strategies of each airlines are mutually restricted and can reach an equilibrium state. However, due to the randomness of passenger demand, the probability of achieving equilibrium in 12 000 simulation experiments is 12.68%, and the probability of not reaching equilibrium Is 87.32%. Therefore, this equilibrium is dynamic and the probability of realization is low. The conclusion is in line with the reality and the model is feasible.