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采用2006-2015年沪、深两市A股主板上市国有公司为研究样本,考察并购对高管晋升与薪酬提升的影响。研究发现,国企并购能够显著增加高管晋升与薪酬提升的可能性。并且,在此过程中存在一个业绩门槛,当公司业绩高于门槛值时,企业并购与高管晋升显著正相关;当公司业绩低于门槛值时,企业并购与薪酬提升显著正相关。本文研究结论证实,国企高管的政治与经济身份具有不同的激励目标并引发较大的行为差异,为国企高管激励契约改革提供一定的经验证据。
Based on the sample of state-owned listed companies listed on A-share in Shanghai and Shenzhen from 2006 to 2015, this paper examines the impact of mergers and acquisitions on executive promotion and pay rise. The study found that state-owned enterprises mergers and acquisitions can significantly increase the possibility of executive promotion and salary increases. And there is a performance threshold in this process. When the performance of the company is above the threshold, M & A is significantly and positively correlated with the promotion of the executive. When the performance of the company is below the threshold, the M & A of the company has a significant positive correlation with the salary increase. The conclusion of this paper confirms that the political and economic identities of state-owned executives have different motivational goals and lead to greater behavioral differences, providing some empirical evidence for the SOE executives’ incentive contract reform.