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本世纪初,美国接连发生财务欺诈案件。在众多的欺诈案件中,激进的会计政策常被用作盈余操纵的手段,而会计准则更加强调谨慎性(即稳健性)。会计稳健性要求会计盈余反映的“坏消息”要比“好消息”更加及时,对“好消息”的确认必须等到实现,而对“坏消息”却要及时,这一方面降低了会计盈余,一方面提高了可靠性。所以,稳健性是盈余质量的一个重要属性。而财务欺诈案件的背后始终离不开审计师的影子,审计师总是与客户存在诸多的利益关系。这一现象已经引起监管部门的关注。2002年美国国会通过的《萨班斯一奥克斯法案》要求强制轮换注册会计师事务所,但并没有作出时间上的规定。我国也效仿美国的做法出台了类似的规定。事务所任期(即审计任期)对盈余质量有什么影响?审计任期多长为宜?本文试图从会计稳健性视角提供经验证据。
At the beginning of this century, the United States has successively incurred financial fraud cases. In many cases of fraud, aggressive accounting policies are often used as a means of earnings manipulation, while accounting standards more emphasis on prudence (ie, robustness). Accounting conservatism requires that the “bad news” reflected in the accounting earnings be more timely than the “good news”, the confirmation of “good news” must wait till the realization and the “bad news” must be timely, On the one hand, it reduces the accounting earnings and on the other hand improves the reliability. So, prudence is an important attribute of earnings quality. The financial fraud cases are always behind the shadow of the auditors, auditors always have many interests with the customer relationship. This phenomenon has caused regulatory attention. The 2002 Sarbanes-Oxley Act passed by the U.S. Congress required mandatory rotation of certified public accountants firms, but no time-limit was laid down. My country also followed the example of the United States in issuing similar provisions. What is the impact of the firm’s term of office (ie, the audit term) on the quality of earnings and how long is the audit term? This article attempts to provide empirical evidence from the perspective of accounting conservatism.