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管理层股权激励是现代化企业治理的重要组成部分,但股权激励也会面临着管理层为自身利益最大化而采取盈余管理的方式来操纵利润。本文选择了沪深两市35家国有企业上市公司作为研究样本,运用配对描述性分析、线性回归分析等统计方法检验了股权激励与盈余管理的关系,发现在股权激励公告前一年,企业管理层会采取负向的盈余管理,而且股权激励程度越高,则管理层采取的负向盈余管理越强;相反,在股权激励行权日前一年,管理层会采取正向的盈余管理,而且股权激励程度越高,采取的正向盈余管理越强。此外,规模越大的企业,管理层进行盈余管理的可能性越大,在股权激励公告日前,采取负向盈余管理;在股权激励行权日前,采取正向盈余管理。
Management equity incentive is an important part of modern corporate governance, but equity incentive also faces management’s profit-manipulation approach to profit maximization. This paper chooses 35 state-owned listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen stock market as the research samples, and uses the descriptive analysis of pairing and linear regression analysis to test the relationship between equity incentive and earnings management. It is found that in the year before the announcement of equity incentive, The negative earnings management will be negative and the higher the equity incentive will be, the stronger the management’s negative earnings management. On the contrary, the management will adopt positive earnings management one year prior to the equity incentive exercise, and The higher the equity incentive, the stronger the positive earnings management. In addition, the larger the size of the business, management, the greater the possibility of earnings management, before the announcement of equity incentives to take negative earnings management; equity incentive exercise date, the positive earnings management.