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一、导言当代科学哲学家与科学社会学家之间的论战,常常表现在他们对认知价值的历史条件性的意义理解不同。T.库恩的《科学革命的结构》(SSR)已经发表了30年,但是围绕他的“历史主义”对英美经验论的逻辑中心主义的质疑的实质,人们仍然争论不休。历史主义运动形成于五、六十年代,在其萌芽阶段就蕴含着种种分歧因素,以致于在今天其内部仍呈现着繁杂的多样性。比如说自我描述的历史主义者就既不同意客观主义也不同意相对主义的观点。历史主义者认为作出评价的基本单元是“大理论”(macro-theory)而不是某一种“理论”,所
I. INTRODUCTION The polemics between contemporary philosophers of science and sociologists of science often manifest themselves in their differing understandings of the historical conditions of cognitive value. T. Kuhn’s “Structure of Scientific Revolutions” (SSR) has been published for 30 years, but the substance of the questioning of Logistic-centrism in Anglo-American empiricism surrounding his “historicism” is still debated. The formation of the historicist movement in the 1950s and 1960s left a variety of disagreements at its infancy, so that today there is still a great variety of diversity within it. For example, the self-described historicists disagreed with both objectivism and relativism. The historicists think that the basic unit of evaluation is “macro-theory” rather than “theory”.