本文以2004—2014年中国上市公司公告的委托贷款样本为研究对象,实证考察了股权关联对企业间信贷抵押要求的影响。研究发现,股权关联与抵押要求显著负相关,关联程度越大,信贷过程中要求抵押的概率越小。进一步的分析揭示出,股权关联对抵押要求的降低作用表现出丰富差异性:一方面,与整体经济资金趋紧时比,资金宽松时期股权关联对抵押的降低效应较大;另一方面,与金融市场化程度较高(法制环境较好)地区比,在金融市场化程度较低(法制环境较差)地区,股权关联对抵押施加的降低效应相对较大。而且,基于借贷距离的扩展性检验表明,股权关联通过其带来的信息控制优势降低了抵押要求。这些研究结果丰富了我们对企业集团内部借贷市场和股权关联这一关系机制的理解和认识。 Based on the sample of entrusted loans announced by listed companies in China from 2004 to 2014, this paper empirically examines the impact of equity ownership on the demand for credit mortgages among enterprises. The study found that the relationship between equity and mortgage requirements was significantly negatively correlated, the greater the degree of correlation, the smaller the probability of mortgage in the credit process. Further analysis revealed that equity reduction has a great difference in reducing the mortgage demand: on the one hand, compared with the tightening of the overall economic funds, the equity reduction of the equity plays a greater role in reducing the mortgage; on the other hand, In areas with a higher degree of financial marketization (a better legal environment) than in areas with a relatively low level of financial marketization (the legal environment is poor), the equity reduction effect on mortgages is relatively large. Moreover, the scalability test based on the borrowing distance shows that the equity control reduces the mortgage requirement through the information control advantage brought by it. These findings have enriched our understanding and understanding of the relationship mechanism between the lending market and equity ownership within an enterprise group.