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传统观点认为,行政指导是一种非权力行为,这一定论形成的深层次原因是日本法学从德国继受而来的分析法学传统。但通过社会实证分析,就会发现“事实上的强制力”和“给予好处”等保障机制使行政指导至少在一定范围内带有权力色彩,这也正是各国特别是日本加强对行政指导的法律控制的认识论基础。“非权力行为”的定性与高强度法律控制之间出现的悖论导源于两种方法论基础的冲突。
According to the traditional view, administrative guidance is a kind of non-power behavior. The deep-seated reason of this certain conclusion is the analytical jurisprudence inherited from Japanese law in Germany. However, through social empirical analysis, we can find that the safeguard mechanisms such as “de facto coercion” and “giving benefits” make the administrative guidance at least within a certain range of power. This is precisely the reason why all countries, especially Japan, have stepped up their administrative guidance The Epistemological Basis of Legal Control. The paradox that arises between the qualitative and the high-intensity legal control of “non-power” behavior stems from the conflict between the two methodologies.