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传统代理人激励模型建立在参与人自利性假设基础之上,本文引入“不公厌恶”和“风险厌恶”因素,由浅入深地研究激励因素、风险厌恶和不公厌恶三者对经理人最优持股契约的影响。发现经理人的风险厌恶倾向导致其减低持股比例,激励因素倾向于使经理人增加持股比例,而不公厌恶使得经理人持股比例在1/2左右。当经理人努力是不可缔约的且经理人是不公厌恶和风险厌恶时,为激励经理人进行智力投资,必须赋予其一定比例的股权,使委托人与代理人利益趋于一致,以降低由经理人不公厌恶产生的效用损失,进而降低委托代理成本。
The traditional agent incentive model is based on the assumptions of participants’ self-interest. This paper introduces the factors of “unfair aversion” and “risk aversion”, and studies the motivation factors, risk aversion and unfair aversion from shallow to deep The Effect of Manager Optimal Stock Ownership Contract. It is found that managers’ risk aversion tends to reduce their shareholding ratio. The incentive factor tends to increase the manager’s shareholding ratio, while the unfair aversion makes the manager’s shareholding ratio about 1/2. In order to motivate managers to invest their intelligence, managers must be given a certain proportion of their share of equity when the manager’s efforts are not contracted and the managers are unfair and risk-averse, and the interests of the principal and the agent tend to be in line with each other, The injustice caused by unjust utility losses, thereby reducing the commission agency costs.