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考虑一个制造商通过其双渠道供应链销售产品,同时存在另一制造商仅通过网络直销渠道销售可替代产品,研究品牌竞争下该双渠道供应链的定价策略及协调机制。基于价格和服务敏感的线性需求,建立考虑品牌竞争和渠道竞争双重影响的定价模型,通过Nash博弈得到三方在分散决策和集中决策下的最优定价和期望利润。数值模拟证明,分散决策降低了供应链的整体效率;各博弈方的最优定价和期望利润均是关于品牌忠诚度、交叉价格弹性系数的增函数,并且相对于品牌竞争,渠道竞争对双渠道供应链的影响更显著。因此为加强渠道合作,建立基于服务合作的协调契约,研究结果表明该契约不仅可以实现双渠道供应链的协调,而且可以使得此双渠道销售的产品更具有竞争力。
Consider a manufacturer selling products through its dual-channel supply chain, while another manufacturer researches the pricing strategy and coordination mechanism of the dual-channel supply chain under the brand competition only by selling alternative products through the network direct sales channel. Based on the linear demand of price and service sensitivity, a pricing model considering the dual influence of brand competition and channel competition is established, and the optimal pricing and expected profit of the three parties under decentralized and centralized decision are obtained through Nash game. Numerical simulation proves that decentralized decision-making reduces the overall efficiency of the supply chain. The optimal pricing and expected profit of each game player are the increasing functions of brand loyalty and cross-price elasticity of elasticity. Compared with brand competition and channel competition, The impact of the supply chain is more pronounced. Therefore, in order to strengthen the channel cooperation, a coordination contract based on service cooperation is established. The result shows that the contract can not only achieve the coordination of the two-channel supply chain, but also make the products sold by this channel more competitive.