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数学直观被胡塞尔视作最高级的范畴直观,它所带来的明见性既是确然的,又是确实的。这似乎意味着数学直观是必然正确的。但另一方面,胡塞尔持有一种数学柏拉图主义,而这又要求数学直观是可错的。为解决这一矛盾,数学明见性,从其确实性维度,必须借助于哥德尔不完全性定理,被理解为非完全确实的;而从确然性维度,它应被理解为是由主体经验所建构的,依然受到主体可设想能力的限制。
Mathematical intuition is intuitively viewed by Husserl as the most advanced category, and the visibility it brings is both definite and definite. This seems to imply that mathematical intuition is necessarily correct. On the other hand, however, Husserl holds a mathematical Platonism, which in turn requires mathematical intuition to be erroneous. In order to solve this contradiction, the mathematics seeability, from its exact dimension, must be understood as not completely true by means of Gödel’s incompleteness theorem; whereas from the certainty dimensionality, it should be understood as being composed of the main body Constructed by experience, it is still restricted by the ability of the subject to conceive.