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文章以我国2001-2012年持续上市且经理人有自利动机的公司为样本,研究了公司治理机制能否通过制约经理人的自利动机,进而对费用粘性造成影响。研究结果发现,在公司治理水平较高的公司,经理人的自利动机受到制约,从而导致较低水平的费用粘性;而在公司治理水平较低的公司,经理人的自利动机比较明显,费用粘性也相对较高。进一步研究发现,公司治理水平与公司价值呈显著的正相关关系。上述研究结论对如何加强公司治理以制约经理人自利动机从而减轻代理问题,如何加强费用控制以提高公司价值有现实的指导意义。
Based on the sample of listed companies in China listed from 2001 to 2012 and the manager motivated by self-motivation, this paper studies whether the corporate governance mechanism can affect the stickiness of expenses by restricting managers’ self-interest motivation. The results show that in companies with high corporate governance, motivation of managers is restrained, leading to a lower level of cost stickiness; while in companies with lower corporate governance, motivation of managers is obvious, Cost sticky is relatively high. Further study found that the level of corporate governance and corporate value was significantly positive correlation. The conclusions of the above research have practical guiding significance on how to strengthen corporate governance to restrict managers’ self-motivation to reduce agency problems and how to strengthen cost control to improve the company’s value.