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薪酬委员会的目标之一是为上市公司制定良好的薪酬制度,使经理层与股东利益一致,从而提升公司价值。我国引入的薪酬委员会制度能实现该目标吗?文章选择2002-2006年上市公司自愿设立薪酬委员会作为研究样本,就有效契约论和经理人权力理论对薪酬委员会制度是否有助于提高公司薪酬业绩敏感度进行了理论阐释和实证检验。研究发现:(1)自愿设立薪酬委员会的上市公司的高管薪酬越高,薪酬业绩敏感度越低;(2)公司相对业绩水平会影响薪酬委员会的作用,尤其是相对业绩较差的公司,设立薪酬委员会显著降低了薪酬业绩敏感度;(3)市场化进程也会影响薪酬委员会的作用,市场化程度高(低)会显著增强(减弱)薪酬委员会设立对薪酬业绩敏感度的影响。研究结果表明,薪酬委员会制度的自愿设立更符合经理人权力理论,薪酬委员会的强制设立在短期内并未对提升高管薪酬业绩敏感度发挥作用。
One of the objectives of the remuneration committee is to set a good remuneration system for listed companies so that managers and shareholders share the same interests so as to enhance the value of the company. The system of remuneration committee introduced by our country can achieve this goal. The article chooses the voluntary establishment of the remuneration committee from 2002 to 2006 as a sample of the study, and analyzes whether the effective contract theory and manager’s power theory are sensitive to the remuneration committee system to improve the company’s remuneration performance Degree of theoretical interpretation and empirical test. The findings are as follows: (1) The higher executive compensation of listed companies who set up compensation committees voluntarily, the lower the sensitivity of remuneration performance; (2) The relative performance of the company will affect the role of remuneration committee, especially the relatively poor performance of companies, The establishment of a remuneration committee significantly reduces the remuneration performance sensitivity; (3) The marketization process also affects the remuneration committee. The higher (lower) marketization will significantly (reduce) the influence of the remuneration committee on the remuneration performance sensitivity. The results show that the voluntary establishment of the remuneration committee system is more in line with the manager’s power theory. The compulsory establishment of the remuneration committee does not play a role in enhancing the sensitivity of remuneration performance in the short term.