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对于民法过失责任的理据,报应型公正的问题在于它忽视了对损害的弥补;当代人对亚里士多德矫正公正新的诠释,亦没有给出过失责任的直接依据;功利主义无法逻辑地解释过失责任中的“内部运气”与“外部运气”;康德的普遍法原则和目的亦无法证明为什么过失责任必须以“损害结果”为必要条件。过失责任的依据,须在分配公正的框架下考察。分配公正考虑的是好处和负担的分配,其解决的问题是:“要想实现这样的分配目标,应当给予主体法律上的自由还是相反。”社会的最终分配目标总是对法律责任的设计模式产生根本性的影响,过失责任亦不例外。
The rationale for retributive justice in civil law lies in its neglect of making up for damage; the contemporary interpretation of Aristotle by the present people does not give any direct basis for negligent liability; and utilitarianism can not logically Explain “internal luck ” and “external luck ” in fault liability, and Kant’s principle and purpose of universal law can not prove why fault liability must be “damaged result” as a necessary condition. The basis for liability for negligence must be examined under the framework of fair distribution. The fairness of distribution is the distribution of benefits and burdens. The problem to be solved is: “The ultimate goal of legal distribution should be given to the main body of the law, or vice versa. ” The ultimate goal of social distribution is always to legal liability Design patterns have a fundamental impact, and liability for negligence is no exception.