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通过对分散决策情景下两个销售商组成的转运系统进行研究,同时考虑消费者需求转移和替代品的情况,建立无限期鲁宾斯坦轮流出价讨价还价博弈,得到唯一子博弈完美纳什均衡。以转运未发生时双方的期望增量收益作为破裂点分析了双方转运的机会成本,最后利用唯一子博弈完美纳什均衡和破裂点为转运双方提供了一份均衡契约。所采用的方法和分析过程非常贴合实际情况,为转运决策制定和转运价格制定提供了方法和依据。
By researching the trans-shipment system composed of two vendors under the decentralized decision-making scenario and taking into account the situation of consumers’ demand transfer and alternatives, an infinite period Rubinstein turns-taking bargaining game is established to obtain the perfect sub-game Nash equilibrium. The opportunity cost of the two parties’ transit is analyzed by the expectation incremental revenue of the two parties when the unloading happens. Finally, a perfect equilibrium contract is provided for the transshipment parties by using the unique subgame perfect Nash equilibrium and breaking point. The methods and analysis adopted are very close to the actual situation and provide a method and a basis for formulating the transshipment decision-making and transacting the price.