上市公司违规行为会损害投资者的合法权益,当这种损害较为严重时,投资者就会退出交易,导致证券市场投资不足、效率低下。因此,我国出台了一系列法律、法规规范上市公司行为。但在实际监管操作中,相应法律、法规并没有得到有效执行。经常是监管者依据不同情势,有意识、主动地选择放松监管或过度监管,甚至运动式监管,本文均称为选择性监管,或称为监管的选择性。本文将基于戴治勇和杨晓维的选择性执法理论,对我国上市公司关联交易监管中的“选择性监管”行为进行分析。 If a listed company violates the law, it will damage the legitimate rights and interests of investors. When such damage is serious, investors will withdraw from the transaction, resulting in underinvestment in the securities market and inefficiency. Therefore, our country has promulgated a series of laws and regulations to regulate the behavior of listed companies. However, in the actual supervision and operation, the corresponding laws and regulations have not been effectively implemented. Often regulators based on different situations, consciously and proactively choose to relax supervision or over regulation, and even sports regulation, this article are referred to as selective regulation, or regulatory selectivity. Based on the theory of selective law enforcement by Dai Zhiyong and Yang Xiaowei, this article analyzes the “selective regulation ” behavior in the supervision of connected transactions of Chinese listed companies.