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该文利用中国2002-2013年间282个地级及地级以上城市的面板数据,运用动态面板数据模型实证检验了土地财政对地方政府规模的影响效应。研究结果表明,地方政府的土地财政收支行为显著推动了地方政府规模的扩张,土地财政与地方政府规模之间存在倒U形关系,并且公共品的供给和收入差距也强化了土地财政对地方政府规模扩张的促进作用。进一步分析发现,土地财政对地方政府规模的影响存在显著的区域性差异,土地财政对东部地区地方政府规模的影响程度明显低于中、西部地区。土地财政还对一线城市政府规模的扩张有抑制作用,表明土地财政是导致地方政府规模变化出现区域性差异的重要因素。此外,财政分权促进了地方政府规模扩张,而经济发展则限制了地方政府规模扩张,表明“利维坦”假说和瓦格纳定律并未得到中国城市层面的经验数据支持。
In this paper, panel data of 282 prefectural and prefecture-level cities in China from 2002 to 2013 are used to empirically test the effect of land finance on the size of local governments by using the dynamic panel data model. The results show that the local government revenue and expenditure behavior of land significantly promoted the expansion of local government scale, land finance and the scale of local government there is an inverted U-shaped relationship, and the public goods supply and income gap also strengthened the land finance on the local The role of government in promoting the expansion of the scale. Further analysis found that the impact of land finance on the size of local government there is a significant regional differences, the impact of land finance on the scale of local government in eastern regions was significantly lower than the central and western regions. Land finance also has an inhibitory effect on the expansion of the size of the first-tier cities, indicating that land finance is an important factor that causes regional differences in the scale of local governments. In addition, fiscal decentralization has promoted the expansion of local government scale, while economic development has limited the scale expansion of local governments, indicating that the “Leviathan ” hypothesis and Wagner ’s law are not supported by the empirical data at the urban level in China.