规则若被用作无任何非特定反例之标准且其适用总是无争议,则罗纳德·德沃金所抨击的那种“规则模型”(model of rules)是一种荒谬的规则模型。德沃金给出充分理由而认为,在(例如)英国法中不存在此类标准或几乎不存在任何标准。但这种规则模型并没有像德沃金所宣称的那样被人误解,相反,它需要我们对这一规则观作出更好的理解。我认为,那种认为一个社会的法律是一套规则系统之观点需要面对德沃金曾经对法理学提出的一项重要挑战:去对法律权利与义务常常受争议之事实作出说明。在本文中我将论及社会规则,这一论述将对社会规则适用于具体案件时何以常常受争议且可能是深层次的争议作出解释。因此,有争议不是摒弃该规则模型的理由。 If the rules were to be used as a standard without any non-specific negative examples and their application was always uncontested, the “model of rules” criticized by Ronald Dworkin was a ridiculous rule model. Dworkin gives good reason for believing that there are no such standards or few standards in (for example) British law. However, this model of the rule has not been misunderstood as Dworkin has claimed. On the contrary, it requires us to have a better understanding of this rule. I think the view that a society’s law is a system of rules needs to address the important challenge Dworkin once posed to jurisprudence: to account for the often debated fact of legal rights and obligations. In this article I will deal with social rules that explain how often the controversial and probably deep-seated controversy is drawn when social rules apply to specific cases. Therefore, the controversy is not the reason to abandon the rule model.