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风险投资是一种向新兴的、迅速发展并有巨大增长潜力的企业,尤其是高科技企业,提供股权投资以获取高资本收益的投资行为。正如我国其它类型的企业一样,在风险资本运行的过程中,也会产生明显的委托代理关系,从而对高科技企业的治理结构及其治理机制安排产生影响。这一问题需要得到科学、有效的研究与解决。本文结合风险投资工作的实践和相关研究,从对风险投资的对象——风险企业角度,对此问题作一探讨。逆向选择和道德风险:风险企业同样面临的委托代理问题委托代理理论的核心问题是如何保
Venture capital investment is a kind of investment that provides equity investment for high capital gains to new and rapidly developing enterprises with huge growth potential, especially high-tech enterprises. Just like other types of enterprises in our country, they also have obvious principal-agent relationship during the process of venture capital operation, which will affect the governance structure and governance mechanism arrangement of high-tech enterprises. This issue needs to be scientifically and effectively researched and solved. In this paper, the practice of venture capital work and related research, from the perspective of venture capital investment enterprises - to explore this issue. Reverse selection and moral hazard: the same problem faced by venture capital firms The key problem of principal-agent theory is how to protect