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When Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe ascended the steps of the Yasukuni Shrine in late December last year， he knew what it would mean for Japan’s relations with China and South Korea. What may have come as a surprise was the damage his move would cause to the U.S.-Japan alliance.
A crushing blow
The Yasukuni Shrine is a controversial Tokyo shrine that honors Japanese war dead and their family members. Also enshrined there are 14 Class-A war criminals from World War II including wartime Prime Minister Hideki Tojo as well as 2，000 others convicted of war crimes by the International Military Tribunal for the Far East.
After Abe’s visit to the shrine， China lodged a strong protest. A Foreign Ministry spokesman remarked that Abe has closed the door of dialogue with Chinese leaders by his own hand.
Abe’s shrine visit was the Asian equivalent of honoring the Nazis. Chinese Ambassador to Japan Cheng Yonghua said Abe crossed a red line and dealt a heavy blow to bilateral relations.
Ties between China and Japan have fallen to their lowest point since they normalized diplomatic relations in 1972. For the two countries， there is little space for either to retreat from their stances. They may have even entered into a new cold war phase， as did Japan and South Korea. Though Abe expressed publicly that he is willing to have dialogue unconditionally with Chinese and South Korean leaders after the shrine visit， it comes across to many in Asia as an empty diplomatic gesture， failing to generate a positive response from Beijing and Seoul.
In fact， territorial disputes and historical problems are not the whole cause of the current strained relationship between China and Japan. To a great extent， the deterioration of bilateral relations stems from the deepening of strategic conflicts between the two. In recent years， with the rapid rise of China and the advancing of Pyongyang’s nuclear program， Japan， which has been badly hit by economic stagnation， believes that its neighboring security environment has significantly worsened. As a result， it has turned sharply right both politically and socially.
After Abe took power for the second time in December 2012， he began taking advantage of this rightist bent by catering to Japan’s nationalism in order to solidify his domestic support. In January 2013， an editorial of U.S.-based The New York Times defined Abe as a “conservative nationalist” and said that his policy is bound to increase tension in East Asia. A three-way game
From a geo-strategic perspective， the confrontation between China and Japan is part of the trilateral game among China， Japan and the United States.
The United States is an important element to the landscape of East Asia and the regional security situation. The main purpose of U.S. President Barack Obama’s “pivot to Asia” strategy initiated in his first term is to cope with the rise of China. The United States on the one hand has to enhance cooperation with China as the latter’s international influence continues to rise； on the other hand， it has actively intensified military deployment in the Asia Pacific and strengthened ties with regional allies， including Japan， to maintain its deterrence.
But in practice， the Obama administration has to face domestic bottlenecks including an economic downturn and budget crises as well as lingering global hotspot issues. Therefore， it cannot fully achieve the original objectives of its rebalancing strategy， and it is also difficult to fully implement the security commitments to its allies.
Tokyo， for its part， is laden with anxiety about Washington’s strategic dilemma in Asia. A Japanese official told Philip Stephens， Associate Editor of British newspaper Financial Times， that Abe noticed that the United States failed to back the Philippines in its South China Sea dispute with Beijing， wherein the Manila government was “left high and dry.” Japan would not make the same mistake， choosing instead to repel “Chinese incursions” with its own naval forces， Stephens wrote. Abe would also loosen the constitutional constraints on Japan’s military budget.
Japan’s Tokyo Shimbun newspaper recently said in an editorial that the Obama administration’s acceptance of China’s proposal to build a new type of relationship between major powers is tantamount to Washington’s announcement of changing its original arrangement of the AsiaPacific strategy and establishing a diplomatic and security policy with Sino-U.S. relations as the core. Under the circumstances， if Japan continues clinging to the United States， it will surely be thrown into a state of embarrassment. It is thus necessary for Japan to pursue an independent foreign policy.
Many Japanese media attribute Japan’s move to restore national strength and power in the changing East Asia to the shelter of the U.S.-Japan alliance， adding that the biggest practical problem facing Japan is how to survive between the two great powers of the United States and China. A superpower sandwich
The United States has performed a delicate balancing act over the increasingly strained SinoJapanese relationship. In its public press releases， Washington claims its relations with Beijing and Tokyo are equally important and that it will not take sides. It is unwilling to be dragged into a possible military conflict， either. Washington’s main priority is preventing the Sino-Japanese political confrontation from escalating into war.
During U.S. Vice President Joe Biden’s latest Japan trip in December 2013， he advised Abe not to make the mistake of visiting the Yasukuni Shrine. However， Abe played his own game in spite of Biden’s cautious warning. In the meantime， Abe sent Washington a gift by making a compromise on the relocation of the U.S. Marine base in Okinawa. U.S. Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel said the move was “critical” to Washington’s rebalancing to the Asia-Pacific region. Despite the compromise， Japan put U.S. strategic interests in a dire spot by recklessly provoking its neighbors. Therefore， Washington expressed its disappointment with the Abe administration in a statement through its embassy in Tokyo， and delayed Hagel’s phone call with Japan’s defense minister.
Similarly， U.S. Trade Representative Michael Froman canceled his scheduled meeting with the Japanese minister of economy， trade and industry in January， which is believed to be a U.S. tactic pressuring Japan on Trans-Pacific Partnership （TPP） free trade negotiations as the latter is troubled by diplomatic isolation. The TPP is one of the pillars of the Obama administration’s “pivot to Asia” strategy. Since their start in July 2013， TPP negotiations between Washington and Tokyo have not gone smoothly.
What makes Japan even more nervous is that during high-level official talks between Washington and Seoul， the U.S. side frankly expressed its unhappiness with Abe’s shrine visit and even leaked a message that Obama might cancel his Japan trip this April. Abe then had to send several urgent missions to Washington to contain the fallout. Hence， it is unavoidable that the Abe administration might offer up even more concessions over bilateral issues to the United States.
Abe clearly underestimated Washington’s anger over his shrine visit. It seemed that he did not realize that his deeds not only exposed the instability of the U.S.-Japanese alliance’s common values but also threatened the U.S. position in the Asia Pacific. But no one can deny that the Obama administration’s recognition of Japan’s administrative jurisdiction over the Diaoyu Islands and confirmation that the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty is applicable to these islands show favoritism to Japan. The United States also supports Japan’s exercising of the right to “collective selfdefense” so that it could fight side by side with U.S. forces. Washington’s pragmatic approach of using Japan to rein in China’s rise and benefiting from the disputes between China and Japan is widely criticized within China， further deepening mutual political mistrust between Washington and Beijing.
Japan’s marginalization
The regional stability in East Asia after the Cold War is determined by the power balance of the three-way relationship between China， the United States and Japan. At present， the global influence of Sino-U.S. relations has far exceeded that of the U.S.-Japan alliance. Japan is at risk of being marginalized. Washington does not want to see a prominent China in Asia and will continue to adjust its strategy to respond the challenge brought by China’s rise. It will reiterate its strategic reassurance to Japan and tacitly consent to Japan’s constitutional revision. However， if Tokyo says no to Washington or makes any provocation on historical issues， Washington could also take its “little brother” down a notch.
In an article published on the Financial Times website， former U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Kurt M. Campbell， who was also in charge of the Obama administration’s “pivot to Asia” policy， said that the United States should provide counsel on how to chart the course for Japan to become a “normal”country， which is the best way to help preserve U.S.-Japan relations.
In China， most people believe that Japan is permanently attached to the hip of the United States on most matters and they have regularly viewed Sino-Japanese relations as “the extension” or “a mirror” of Sino-U.S. relations. This is an imprecise perception. It is neither realistic nor reasonable to require the United States to curb Japan， but it is necessary and urgent for both Beijing and Washington to strengthen coordination on establishing a bottom line for the future direction of Tokyo.
In the long run， China and the United States are the leading players for maintaining the peace and prosperity of the Asia-Pacific region. Japan cannot hinder China and the United States from building a new type of partnership between major powers， as the new relationship bears global significance.
At present， while chances for military confrontation in the Asia-Pacific between the three countries are slim， the risk of accidental clashes brought by the strained situation cannot be neglected. The deadlock might be broken only with the stepping down of hawkish Japanese Prime Minister Abe. Japan is already behaving like a runaway wild horse， a trend that could be seen as further evidence to the decline of the United States’ global influence.
A crushing blow
The Yasukuni Shrine is a controversial Tokyo shrine that honors Japanese war dead and their family members. Also enshrined there are 14 Class-A war criminals from World War II including wartime Prime Minister Hideki Tojo as well as 2，000 others convicted of war crimes by the International Military Tribunal for the Far East.
After Abe’s visit to the shrine， China lodged a strong protest. A Foreign Ministry spokesman remarked that Abe has closed the door of dialogue with Chinese leaders by his own hand.
Abe’s shrine visit was the Asian equivalent of honoring the Nazis. Chinese Ambassador to Japan Cheng Yonghua said Abe crossed a red line and dealt a heavy blow to bilateral relations.
Ties between China and Japan have fallen to their lowest point since they normalized diplomatic relations in 1972. For the two countries， there is little space for either to retreat from their stances. They may have even entered into a new cold war phase， as did Japan and South Korea. Though Abe expressed publicly that he is willing to have dialogue unconditionally with Chinese and South Korean leaders after the shrine visit， it comes across to many in Asia as an empty diplomatic gesture， failing to generate a positive response from Beijing and Seoul.
In fact， territorial disputes and historical problems are not the whole cause of the current strained relationship between China and Japan. To a great extent， the deterioration of bilateral relations stems from the deepening of strategic conflicts between the two. In recent years， with the rapid rise of China and the advancing of Pyongyang’s nuclear program， Japan， which has been badly hit by economic stagnation， believes that its neighboring security environment has significantly worsened. As a result， it has turned sharply right both politically and socially.
After Abe took power for the second time in December 2012， he began taking advantage of this rightist bent by catering to Japan’s nationalism in order to solidify his domestic support. In January 2013， an editorial of U.S.-based The New York Times defined Abe as a “conservative nationalist” and said that his policy is bound to increase tension in East Asia. A three-way game
From a geo-strategic perspective， the confrontation between China and Japan is part of the trilateral game among China， Japan and the United States.
The United States is an important element to the landscape of East Asia and the regional security situation. The main purpose of U.S. President Barack Obama’s “pivot to Asia” strategy initiated in his first term is to cope with the rise of China. The United States on the one hand has to enhance cooperation with China as the latter’s international influence continues to rise； on the other hand， it has actively intensified military deployment in the Asia Pacific and strengthened ties with regional allies， including Japan， to maintain its deterrence.
But in practice， the Obama administration has to face domestic bottlenecks including an economic downturn and budget crises as well as lingering global hotspot issues. Therefore， it cannot fully achieve the original objectives of its rebalancing strategy， and it is also difficult to fully implement the security commitments to its allies.
Tokyo， for its part， is laden with anxiety about Washington’s strategic dilemma in Asia. A Japanese official told Philip Stephens， Associate Editor of British newspaper Financial Times， that Abe noticed that the United States failed to back the Philippines in its South China Sea dispute with Beijing， wherein the Manila government was “left high and dry.” Japan would not make the same mistake， choosing instead to repel “Chinese incursions” with its own naval forces， Stephens wrote. Abe would also loosen the constitutional constraints on Japan’s military budget.
Japan’s Tokyo Shimbun newspaper recently said in an editorial that the Obama administration’s acceptance of China’s proposal to build a new type of relationship between major powers is tantamount to Washington’s announcement of changing its original arrangement of the AsiaPacific strategy and establishing a diplomatic and security policy with Sino-U.S. relations as the core. Under the circumstances， if Japan continues clinging to the United States， it will surely be thrown into a state of embarrassment. It is thus necessary for Japan to pursue an independent foreign policy.
Many Japanese media attribute Japan’s move to restore national strength and power in the changing East Asia to the shelter of the U.S.-Japan alliance， adding that the biggest practical problem facing Japan is how to survive between the two great powers of the United States and China. A superpower sandwich
The United States has performed a delicate balancing act over the increasingly strained SinoJapanese relationship. In its public press releases， Washington claims its relations with Beijing and Tokyo are equally important and that it will not take sides. It is unwilling to be dragged into a possible military conflict， either. Washington’s main priority is preventing the Sino-Japanese political confrontation from escalating into war.
During U.S. Vice President Joe Biden’s latest Japan trip in December 2013， he advised Abe not to make the mistake of visiting the Yasukuni Shrine. However， Abe played his own game in spite of Biden’s cautious warning. In the meantime， Abe sent Washington a gift by making a compromise on the relocation of the U.S. Marine base in Okinawa. U.S. Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel said the move was “critical” to Washington’s rebalancing to the Asia-Pacific region. Despite the compromise， Japan put U.S. strategic interests in a dire spot by recklessly provoking its neighbors. Therefore， Washington expressed its disappointment with the Abe administration in a statement through its embassy in Tokyo， and delayed Hagel’s phone call with Japan’s defense minister.
Similarly， U.S. Trade Representative Michael Froman canceled his scheduled meeting with the Japanese minister of economy， trade and industry in January， which is believed to be a U.S. tactic pressuring Japan on Trans-Pacific Partnership （TPP） free trade negotiations as the latter is troubled by diplomatic isolation. The TPP is one of the pillars of the Obama administration’s “pivot to Asia” strategy. Since their start in July 2013， TPP negotiations between Washington and Tokyo have not gone smoothly.
What makes Japan even more nervous is that during high-level official talks between Washington and Seoul， the U.S. side frankly expressed its unhappiness with Abe’s shrine visit and even leaked a message that Obama might cancel his Japan trip this April. Abe then had to send several urgent missions to Washington to contain the fallout. Hence， it is unavoidable that the Abe administration might offer up even more concessions over bilateral issues to the United States.
Abe clearly underestimated Washington’s anger over his shrine visit. It seemed that he did not realize that his deeds not only exposed the instability of the U.S.-Japanese alliance’s common values but also threatened the U.S. position in the Asia Pacific. But no one can deny that the Obama administration’s recognition of Japan’s administrative jurisdiction over the Diaoyu Islands and confirmation that the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty is applicable to these islands show favoritism to Japan. The United States also supports Japan’s exercising of the right to “collective selfdefense” so that it could fight side by side with U.S. forces. Washington’s pragmatic approach of using Japan to rein in China’s rise and benefiting from the disputes between China and Japan is widely criticized within China， further deepening mutual political mistrust between Washington and Beijing.
Japan’s marginalization
The regional stability in East Asia after the Cold War is determined by the power balance of the three-way relationship between China， the United States and Japan. At present， the global influence of Sino-U.S. relations has far exceeded that of the U.S.-Japan alliance. Japan is at risk of being marginalized. Washington does not want to see a prominent China in Asia and will continue to adjust its strategy to respond the challenge brought by China’s rise. It will reiterate its strategic reassurance to Japan and tacitly consent to Japan’s constitutional revision. However， if Tokyo says no to Washington or makes any provocation on historical issues， Washington could also take its “little brother” down a notch.
In an article published on the Financial Times website， former U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Kurt M. Campbell， who was also in charge of the Obama administration’s “pivot to Asia” policy， said that the United States should provide counsel on how to chart the course for Japan to become a “normal”country， which is the best way to help preserve U.S.-Japan relations.
In China， most people believe that Japan is permanently attached to the hip of the United States on most matters and they have regularly viewed Sino-Japanese relations as “the extension” or “a mirror” of Sino-U.S. relations. This is an imprecise perception. It is neither realistic nor reasonable to require the United States to curb Japan， but it is necessary and urgent for both Beijing and Washington to strengthen coordination on establishing a bottom line for the future direction of Tokyo.
In the long run， China and the United States are the leading players for maintaining the peace and prosperity of the Asia-Pacific region. Japan cannot hinder China and the United States from building a new type of partnership between major powers， as the new relationship bears global significance.
At present， while chances for military confrontation in the Asia-Pacific between the three countries are slim， the risk of accidental clashes brought by the strained situation cannot be neglected. The deadlock might be broken only with the stepping down of hawkish Japanese Prime Minister Abe. Japan is already behaving like a runaway wild horse， a trend that could be seen as further evidence to the decline of the United States’ global influence.