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依据认知神经科学关于道德判断的一系列研究,并援引道德心理学的一些相关研究的结果,加西华·格林(JoshuaGreene)试图表明,人们通常做出的符合道义论的道德判断大多是情绪驱动的产物,而符合后果论的道德判断则多是理性推理的结果。格林认为,这种情况对以康德伦理学为代表的理性主义道义论哲学构成了严重的挑战,认知科学关于道德判断的实验研究表明康德伦理学是错误的。然而,虽然格林富有创意的认知神经科学研究对道义论哲学构成了足以引起重视的挑战,但由于他在推理和实验设计中存在重要的疏忽,忽略了人们在他所谓“非切身的”情境下仍然有可能做出符合道义论的道德判断的情况,致使他在推理上犯了以偏概全的逻辑错误。因此,格林对道义论哲学的攻击是不成功的,认知科学尚未表明康德伦理学是错误的。
Based on a series of studies on moral judgment in cognitive neuroscience and cite the results of some related studies in moral psychology, Joshua Greene attempts to show that most of the moral judgments usually made by people are mostly emotionally driven Of the product, and in line with the consequences of moral judgments are mostly the result of rational reasoning. According to Green, this situation poses a serious challenge to the rationalist moralist philosophy represented by Kant’s ethics. Cognitive science’s experimental research on moral judgment shows that Kant’s ethics is wrong. However, although Green’s creative research in cognitive neuroscience poses a challenge to moralist philosophy enough to attract attention, his negligence in reasoning and experimental design ignores the fact that what he calls “imperceptible” "It is still possible to make a morally moral judgment in the circumstances that led him to make a partial logical error in his reasoning. Therefore, Green’s attack on moralist philosophy is unsuccessful. Cognitive science has not shown that Kant’s ethics is wrong.