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现代企业需要构建企业内部知识库的一个基础条件是要将员工的隐性知识外部化,这一过程中存在着公共物品由私人提供的“囚徒困境”问题。本文就这一问题建立了一个完全信息静态博弈模型,并讨论了风险规避决策参与者的四种纳什均衡解。进一步的,从员工个人角度探讨了纳什均衡下的隐性知识供给,从企业整体利益的角度讨论了帕累托最优的隐性知识供给,并分析比较了这两种状态下的个人贡献量关系。最后,根据上述分析,给出了一系列相应的管理启示。
One of the basic conditions for modern enterprises to build an internal knowledge base is to externalize tacit knowledge of employees. There is a problem of “Prisoners’ Dilemma” where public goods are provided by private individuals. In this paper, a complete information static game model is established on this issue and four kinds of Nash equilibrium solutions of risk aversion decision-makers are discussed. Furthermore, we discuss the supply of tacit knowledge under the Nash equilibrium from the personal point of view of the individual, and discuss the Pareto optimal tacit knowledge supply from the perspective of the overall benefit of the enterprise. We also analyze and compare the individual contributions in these two states relationship. Finally, based on the above analysis, a series of corresponding management implications are given.