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基于2008-2014年沪深两市A股上市公司财务数据,从企业避税角度实证检验零杠杆现象存在的原因。研究表明,与国际市场类似,我国资本市场也存在零杠杆现象,且企业避税程度越大,公司采取极端债务融资决策的可能性越高;而税收征管水平越强,零杠杆现象发生的概率越低。进一步分析发现税收征管可以显著地抑制企业避税与其零杠杆决策间的正向关系,而上述研究结果通过稳健性检验后仍显著成立。研究结论不仅对股东及债权人的投资决策具有参考意义,更重要的是为税务部门等国家政府机关有效地发挥税务征管外部治理效应及优化企业融资环境提供了实证支撑。
Based on the financial data of A-share listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen stock markets during 2008-2014, the reasons for the existence of zero leverage are empirically tested from the perspective of corporate tax avoidance. The research shows that, similar to the international market, there is also zero leverage in China’s capital market, and the greater the degree of tax avoidance, the higher the probability that the company will take extreme debt financing decisions. The higher the tax collection level, the more the probability of zero leverage occurs low. Further analysis found that tax collection can significantly inhibit the positive relationship between tax avoidance and its non-leveraged decision-making, and the results of these studies are still significant after the robustness test. The conclusions of the study not only have reference significance to the investment decision of shareholders and creditors, but more importantly, they provide empirical support for the government departments such as tax authorities to effectively exert the external governance effect of tax collection and management and optimize the financing environment of enterprises.