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Because govments have introduced policies involving incentives and penalties to promote the recycling of plastic waste,it is important to understand the impact of such incentives and penalties on the willingness of stakeholders to participate.In this study,govment is included as a player,alongside waste collectors and recyclers,in a tripartite evolutionary game model of plastic waste recycling.The study explores the evolutionary equilibrium and performs a simulation analysis to elucidate the effect of govment incentives and penalties on the willingness of other players to participate in recycling.Three conclusions are drawn from this research.First,an increase in incentives or in penalties increases the probability that collectors and recyclers will participate in the recycling process.Second,policy support incentives encourage collectors and recyclers to participate in plastic waste recycling earlier than subsidy incentives do.Finally,recyclers are more sensitive than collectors to govment-imposed penalties.