在出口退税管理博弈过程中,不同的行为主体之间存在着不同层面的不对称信息,使得出口退税管理难以达到理想的最优状态。本文试图用博弈论和信息经济学的观点,通过对参与出口退税管理的中央政府与地方政府间以及地方政府之间的博弈分析,从激励机制设计角度探讨如何改进现行的出 In the process of export tax rebate management game, there are different levels of asymmetric information among different actors, making export tax rebate management difficult to achieve the ideal optimal state. This article attempts to use game theory and information economics point of view, through the participation of export tax rebate management between the central government and local governments and local governments between the game analysis, from the perspective of incentive mechanism design how to improve the current out