证券市场的股东与经理人之间存在着一种委托代理关系,信息不对称就显而易见。股东与经理人之间的信息不对称可能导致经理人利用信息优势损害投资人的利益,这个问题如果不加以解决,必然成为证券市场健康发展的巨大障碍。为了减少信息不对称导致的逆向选择,充分的信息披露以增加可为公众获取的信息量就显得至关重要。一、充分披露的界定管理当局有动机隐瞒不利的信息,尽管投资者一般都会注意到这种可能,但他们不了解所隐瞒信息的具体性质,所以相对于较充分披露的情形而言,投资者无法区分不同普通股之间的质量差异,结果证券价格也将无法充分反映这种差异,这就可能导致较低质量的股票以高于充分披露情形下的价格出售,而较高质量的股票则恰好相反,著名的逆向选择现象就会出现。这种以“劣驱良”为特征的 There is a principal-agent relationship between stockholders and managers in the stock market. Asymmetric information is obvious. Asymmetric information between shareholders and managers may lead managers to exploit the advantages of information to undermine the interests of investors. If this problem is not solved, it will inevitably become a huge obstacle to the sound development of the securities market. In order to reduce adverse selection due to asymmetric information, it is crucial to have sufficient information disclosure to increase the amount of information available to the public. I. Fully Disclosured Defining Regulators There are motivations to hide unfavorable information. Although investors generally noticed this possibility, they do not know the exact nature of the information they are hiding, so as to the more fully disclosed information, investors The inability to differentiate the quality differences between different common stock results in the fact that the price of the stock will not adequately reflect this difference, which may result in the sale of lower quality stocks at a price higher than the full disclosure, while higher quality stocks On the contrary, the famous phenomenon of adverse selection will appear. This kind of “inferior drive” is characterized