一直以来,我国企业的薪酬激励机制主要是建立在企业会计利润的基础上,但企业会计利润的确定并没有将企业全部要素成本特别是所有者权益资本成本(股利)扣除,因此,建立在此基础上的薪酬激励机制往往会使企业经营者更重视企业短期效益而忽视所有者的长期利益,一定程度上加大了经营者与所有者价值取向上的背离。而建立在EVA基础上的企业薪酬激励机制可以弥补这一缺陷,能够有效协调企业经营者与所有者的利益趋于一致。本文拟通 All along, the compensation incentive mechanism of Chinese enterprises is mainly based on the accounting profits of enterprises, but the determination of corporate accounting profits does not deduct the total factor cost of the enterprise, especially the cost of capital (dividend) of the owner’s equity. Therefore, Based on the remuneration incentive mechanism will often make business operators pay more attention to short-term corporate profits and ignore the long-term interests of owners, to a certain extent, increased the deviation of the value orientation of managers and owners. The compensation incentive mechanism established on the basis of EVA can make up for this shortcoming and can effectively reconcile the interests of business operators and owners. This article to pass