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以2003—2014年间国有上市公司为研究对象,对冗员的重要经济后果进行了实证检验。研究发现,冗员不仅会加大国有企业的自由现金约束及国企高管的道德风险,还具有显著的投资约束作用。进一步研究得出,适度冗员和过度冗员具有不同的经济后果和治理后果,适度冗员会增强对国企高管的负激励,提升高管的投资动力,而随着冗员的持续增加,自由现金流约束作用和道德风险强化效应则会降低企业的投资规模。同时,冗员与投资效率的关系也进一步佐证了适度冗员的治理作用,适度冗员会降低国企的过度投资水平,而存在过度冗员现象的企业其过度投资也更严重。另外,冗员与投资规模之间的关系仅在公益类国企显著,在商业类国企中并不存在显著的负相关关系;冗员对企业投资的约束作用也仅存在于地方国企,而在中央国企则缺乏此约束作用的证据。外部环境变量,如产品市场竞争程度、企业所在地的GDP增长率和企业所在地的财政赤字率,对冗员与企业投资行为之间的关系没有影响。
Taking the state-owned listed companies from 2003 to 2014 as the research object, this paper empirically tests the important economic consequences of redundancy. The study found that redundant personnel will not only increase the free cash constraints of state-owned enterprises and the moral hazard of state-owned executives, but also have significant investment restraint. Further research shows that moderately redundant and overly redundant personnel have different economic consequences and governance consequences. Moderate redundancy will enhance negative incentives for SOE executives and enhance senior executives’ investment momentum. With the continuous increase of redundancy, free cash flow constraints The role of moral hazard and strengthen the effect will reduce the size of the enterprise investment. At the same time, the relationship between redundant staff and investment efficiency further corroborates the governance role of moderate redundancy. Moderate redundancy reduces the over-investment of state-owned enterprises, and over-investment is more serious in enterprises with excessive redundancy. In addition, the relationship between redundancy and the size of investment is only significant in public welfare state-owned enterprises, there is no significant negative correlation between the commercial state-owned enterprises; the redundant employees on the corporate investment constraints only exist in the local state-owned enterprises, while the central state-owned enterprises Lack of evidence of this constraint. External environmental variables such as the degree of competition in the product market, the GDP growth rate at the location of the enterprise and the fiscal deficit rate at the location of the enterprise have no effect on the relationship between the redundancy and the enterprise’s investment behavior.