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本文剖析各类债务契约对控股股东隧道挖掘行为的影响,从而为各债务主体对控股股东隧道挖掘行为的监督作用提供证据。基于2006—2010年我国A股上市公司的研究样本,实证研究发现:公司债务总体水平越高、短期债务所占比重越大,控股股东越有可能掏空上市公司;银行借款比例、商业信用比例和职工债务比例与控股股东掏空程度显著负相关,各债务主体发挥了监督控股股东行为的作用。
This article analyzes the impact of various types of debt contracts on the tunneling behavior of controlling shareholders, and provides evidence for the monitoring role of various debt owners in the tunneling of controlling shareholders. Based on the research sample of A-share listed companies in China from 2006 to 2010, the empirical study shows that: the higher the overall level of corporate debt, the greater the proportion of short-term debt, the more likely the controlling shareholders will be to hollow out listed companies; the proportion of bank loans, commercial credit ratio And the ratio of employee’s debt and the controlling shareholder’s emptying were significantly and negatively correlated. All the debtors played the role of supervising the controlling shareholder’s behavior.