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随着资本化浪潮进一步高涨,公司高管股权激励机制越来越引起国内外理论界、政治界及商业界的高度关注。在西方成熟资本主义市场,股权激励被视为解决现代企业委托—代理问题的重要途径,亦是促进公司高管与股东形成利益共同体的有力手段,然而股权激励制度在我国正处于起步阶段,较之于美国等发达国家还很不成熟。我国理论界应在西方已有研究理论的基础上,结合中国上市公司的现状,多做理论分析与实证研究,给出相关的建设性意见,帮助我国上市公司更快更好的发展。因此,本文从股权激励的成本收益理论模型出发,引用国内实行股权激励计划企业现有的数据,对模型做了相关检验,并进行了一些改进。
As the wave of capitalization further rises, the executive incentive mechanism of the company executives has drawn more and more attention from the theoretical circles, political circles and business circles at home and abroad. In western mature capitalism market, equity incentive is regarded as an important way to solve the problem of principal-agent in modern enterprises. It is also a powerful way to promote the formation of community of interests between senior executives and shareholders. However, the system of equity incentive is in its infancy in our country, The United States and other developed countries is still very immature. Based on the existing research theories in the West, combining with the status quo of Chinese listed companies, theoretical circles in our country should do more theoretical analysis and empirical research, give relevant constructive suggestions and help the listed companies in our country develop faster and better. Therefore, starting from the theoretical model of cost-benefit of equity incentive, this paper cites the existing data of domestic enterprises that implement equity incentive plan, and makes relevant tests on the model and makes some improvements.