本文认为,有关日本北、南进战略问题的讨论,存在着苏联史学与欧美史学的双重影响。自20年代起迄二战后期,日本虽有以战争手段打击苏联的构想出现,但并未正式确立对苏开战的国策方针,因而并不存在由中国抗战加以阻止的北进战略。为了切断中国交通线以及扩充资源补充国力与战力等多重需要,促使日本加速南进,冒险发动了太平洋战争。太平洋战争是中国战场的延长和扩大。日本实施南进是其侵华战争陷入困境后的被动之举,而传统的认为中国抗战迟滞了日本南进的说法并未能揭示这一实质。 This article argues that the discussion on the strategic issues of Japan’s North and South Vietnam has the dual influence of Soviet historiography and European and American historiography. Since the late 1920s until the end of World War II, although Japan had conceived the idea of ​​using the military means to fight the Soviet Union, it did not formally establish its national policy toward the war of aggression with the Soviet Union. Therefore, there was no northward strategy to be blocked by China’s war of resistance against Japan. In order to cut off the Chinese transportation line and expand resources to supplement the multiple needs of national strength and combat power, Japan was urged to speed up the southbound and take risks in launching the Pacific War. The Pacific War is an extension and expansion of the Chinese battlefield. Japan’s implementation of the south march was a passive move after its war with China was in trouble. The traditional view that China’s resistance to Japan was sluggish and left Japan did not reveal this essence.