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本文扩展了 Joen-Laffont-Tirole(2002)文章的模型,考察了在呼叫方与接听方合作决定通话长度条件下电信运营商的竞争策略。当引入接听方付费和呼叫外部性的假设进入电信竞争模型时,在线性定价条件下,电信运营商制定的呼叫价格与接听价格仍然随着网络替代程度的增加而减少,但是电信运营商不再能够利用接入费来进行合谋。在非线性定价条件下,电信运营商竞争策略是制定使消费者剩余最大化的呼叫价格与接听价格,然后利用固定费榨取消费者剩余。在基于网络的价格歧视条件下,与 Joen-Laffont-Tirole(2002)模型相比较,由于通话时间由消费者合作决定,因此电信运营商将通过固定费进行市场份额的争夺,从而导致按边际成本定价,网络联接并没有因为电信运营商的竞争策略而发生中断。
This paper extends the model of Joen-Laffont-Tirole (2002) article and examines the competitive strategies of telecom operators under the condition that the calling party and answering party cooperate to determine the length of the call. When introducing the assumption of answering party payment and call externalities into the telecom competition model, under the condition of linear pricing, the call price and answering price set by telecom operators still decrease with the increase of network substitution, but the telecom operators no longer Access fees can be used to collude. Under non-linear pricing conditions, the telecom operators’ competition strategy is to formulate the call price and answering price that maximize the consumer surplus, and then use the fixed fee to extract the consumer surplus. Under network-based price discrimination, compared to the Joen-Laffont-Tirole (2002) model, telecom operators will compete for market share with fixed fees as the talk time is determined by consumers, resulting in marginal costs Pricing, network connectivity has not been interrupted by telecom operators’ competitive strategy.