Writable XOR executable (W⊕X) and address space layout randomisation (ASLR) have elevated the understanding necessary to perpetrate buffer overflow exploits [1] . However, they have not proved to be a panacea [1 3] , and so other mechanisms, such as stack guards and prelinking, have been introduced. In this paper, we show that host-based protection still does not offer a complete solution. To demonstrate the protection inadequacies, we perform an over the network brute force return-to-libc attack against a preforking concurrent server to gain remote access to a shell. The attack defeats host protection including W⊕X and ASLR. We then demonstrate that deploying a network intrusion detection systems (NIDS) with appropriate signatures can detect this attack efficiently. Writable XOR executable (W⊕X) and address space layout randomisation (ASLR) have elevated the understanding necessary to perpetrate buffer overflow exploits [1]. However, they have not proved to be a panacea [1 3], and so other mechanisms, such as stack guards and prelinking, have been introduced. In this paper, we show that host-based protection still does not offer a complete solution. To demonstrate the protection inadequacies, we perform an over the network brute force return-to-libc attack The then defected host protection includes W⊕X and ASLR. We then demonstrate that deploying a network intrusion detection systems (NIDS) with appropriate signatures can detect this attack efficiently.