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本文建立了小额贷款公司与监管者之间的博弈模型,利用了不完全信息静态博弈原理,采用混合战略模型,得出了博弈主体之间最大化效用时的均衡状态解,并进一步分析了在双方博弈过程中各种现实因素对均衡状态解的影响,得出了对违规者的处罚及处罚力度、违规者的违规成本、违规被发现所带来的负面影响、违规所带来的违规收益;对监管者失职的处罚即处罚力度、监管者的检查成本、监管者对未来的期望、违规者向监管者提供的公关费用;违规被查出的时间距案发的时间间隔等因素都会对博弈的均衡概率产生一定的影响。
This paper establishes a game model between microfinance companies and regulators, uses the principle of incomplete information static game, and adopts the hybrid strategy model to get the equilibrium state solution when maximizing the utility between game players, and then further analyzes The influence of various realistic factors on the equilibrium state solution in the process of game between the two parties leads to the punishment and punishments to the violators, the non-compliance costs of the violators, the negative influence brought by the discovery of the irregularities and the irregularities caused by the irregularities Income; penalties for regulatory negligence penalties that the regulator’s inspection costs, the regulators of the future expectations of violators to the regulators to provide public relations fees; violations were detected from the crime of the time interval and other factors will be The equilibrium probability of the game has a certain impact.