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本文选取我国2009-2014年沪深A股4042家上市企业为样本,分析了高管薪酬激励与投资不足之间的关系,以及在不同控制人性质和第一大股东持股比例下高管薪酬激励对企业投资不足影响的差异。研究表明:薪酬激励有助于缓解企业的投资不足;国有企业的薪酬激励对缓解企业投资不足有显著影响,但与民营企业相比,缓解作用相对较弱;第一大股东持股比例越高,高管薪酬激励对缓解投资不足的作用越明显。
This paper selects 4042 listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen A stock market during 2009-2014 as a sample to analyze the relationship between executive incentive and underinvestment and the relationship between executive pay under different nature of controlling shareholders and the largest shareholder shareholding ratio Differences in incentives that affect the underinvestment of firms. The research shows that: salary incentive helps to alleviate the underinvestment of enterprises; the incentive compensation of state-owned enterprises has a significant impact on alleviating the underinvestment of enterprises, but the alleviation effect is relatively weaker than that of private enterprises; the higher the proportion of the largest shareholder The more obvious is the role of executive compensation incentives in alleviating the underinvestment.