论文部分内容阅读
文章实证检验了上市公司在实施股票期权激励中管理层的择机行为。研究发现:(1)区间定价样本择机授予期权以降低行权价格;(2)区间定价样本与单日定价样本在定价基准日之后均择机披露利好消息以提高期权价值;(3)当管理层权力较大、公司治理水平较低、最终控制人性质为国有时,管理层同时发生择机授予期权与择机披露信息行为的概率较高,而无形资产占比和公司规模则会降低管理层同时发生以上两种择机行为的概率。文章的研究结论丰富和拓展了已有文献对管理层择机行为的研究成果,而且对于有效推行管理层期权激励计划以及抑制管理层择机行为具有重要的现实意义。
The article empirically tests the management’s opportunistic behavior of listed companies in implementing stock option incentive. The research finds that: (1) Interval pricing samples choose to grant options to reduce the exercise price; (2) Interval pricing samples and single-day pricing samples both choose to disclose good news after the pricing base date to improve the option value; (3) The power is larger, the level of corporate governance is lower, and the nature of the ultimate controller is state-owned, there is a high probability that management will simultaneously choose to grant options and choose to disclose information, while the proportion of intangible assets and the size of the company will reduce the occurrence of management simultaneously The probability of these two alternative behavior. The research conclusion of the article enriches and expands the research results of the existing literature on management choice behavior, and is of important practical significance for the effective implementation of the management option incentive plan and the suppression of management selection behavior.