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本文参考地方政府政绩需求和国资委对国企高管的考核标准,将国有企业过度投资和盈余管理行为视为政治迎合行为,并搜集了我国沪深两市A股市场2009—2013年的数据,研究了国企高管政治晋升激励与政治迎合行为之间的关系。实证结果显示,政治晋升激励会导致国企高管为了获得政治晋升而迎合地方政府的政绩需求,做出过度投资和盈余管理行为,且董事长的过度投资行为尤为明显。进一步探究则发现,薪酬激励会削弱这种正相关关系。综合来看,对国企高管的政治晋升激励并不是可以彻底改善我国公司激励机制的长久之计,只是具有短暂成效、虚假繁荣,却仍会带来诸多政治迎合行为这样饮鸩止渴的激励方式。
This paper refers to the local government performance needs and SASAC assessment criteria for state-owned executives, the state-owned enterprises over-investment and earnings management behavior as a political cater to behavior and collect the data of China’s A-share market in Shanghai and Shenzhen from 2009 to 2013, This paper studies the relationship between the promotion and motivation of political promotion of state-owned executives and their political behavior. Empirical results show that political promotion incentives will lead to state-owned executives in order to obtain political promotion and meet the performance needs of local government, over-investment and earnings management behavior, and the over-investment of the chairman of the board is particularly evident. Further exploration found that salary incentives weaken this positive correlation. Taken together, the political promotion and promotion of SOE executives is not a long-term solution to the thorough improvement of the corporate incentive system in our country. It only has a short-term effect and a false prosperity. However, it still brings many political incentives to drink and thirst.