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本文从新制度经济学角度分析了权力寻租产生的根源 ,认为实现公共产品供给与生产的分离 ,打破政府垄断 ,以切断寻租的源头。指出权力寻租赖以存在的土壤在于渐进式改革过程中制度设计的失当 ,强调在制度设计中要强调利益主体之间责、权、利的相互制衡关系以化解利益主体的冲突。通过对导致权力寻租的制度漏洞分析 ,提出了相应制度创新对策 ,进一步提出要进行体制改革和制度创新 ,建立结构合理、配置科学、程序严密、相互制约的权力运行机制 ,从制度上彻底根除权力寻租的产生。
This paper analyzes the root causes of rent-seeking from the point of view of new institutional economics, considers the separation of supply and production of public goods, breaks the monopoly of government and cuts off the source of rent-seeking. It points out that the existence of power rent-seeking lies in the improper design of the system in the process of gradual reform. It emphasizes that we should emphasize the mutual checks and balances of responsibilities, rights and interests in the system design so as to resolve the conflicts of the stakeholders. Through analyzing the loopholes in the system leading to the rent-seeking of power, this paper puts forward corresponding countermeasures of institutional innovation, and further proposes to carry out system reform and system innovation and establish a power operating mechanism with reasonable structure, scientific configuration, rigorous procedures and mutual restraint and to eradicate systematically The emergence of power rent-seeking.