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制度作为个体群共同认知的自我维系系统,其变迁和演化受个体认知调整影响。本文运用演化博弈论中的演化稳定策略和复制者动态模型,探讨认知因素作用制度变迁的条件和机制。一般情况下,当现行制度不能满足个体的支付预期时,个体将会修正关于原有制度的信念和认知,新认知在“演化选择压力”的作用下接受考验,并成为个体群内的共同认知时,形成新的制度均衡。对于同质认知个体群,以传统认知为特征的习俗惯例相对稳定,但若遵循传统认知的个体频数持续变化,那么个体群新的认知收敛将启动制度演化过程。对于异质认知个体群,制度演化结果与个体群初始的认知分布状态显著相关,对个体互动的支付结构做出相应调整,能够对制度演化方向进行诱导。
As a self-sustaining system of co-cognition of individual groups, the change and evolution of system are influenced by individual cognitive adjustment. In this paper, we use evolutionary stabilization strategy and replicator dynamic model in evolutionary game theory to explore the conditions and mechanism of institutional change of cognitive factors. Under normal circumstances, when the current system can not meet the individual’s expectation of payment, the individual will correct the belief and cognition of the original system. The new cognition will be tested under the influence of “pressure of evolutionary selection” and become an individual group Within the common understanding of the formation of a new system of equilibrium. For homogeneous cognition groups, customary conventions characterized by traditional cognition are relatively stable, but if the frequency of individuals following traditional cognition continues to change, the new cognitive convergence of individual groups will initiate institutional evolution. For heterogeneous cognitive groups, the results of institutional evolution are significantly related to the initial cognitive distribution of individual groups, and corresponding adjustments are made to the payment structure of individual interactions, which can induce the evolution of institutions.