电信、电力、铁路等这类具有自然垄断属性的网络产业定价问题关系到国计民生。本文建立一个“双重委托——代理”体系下的激励规制模型,分析存在信息不对称和规制收买情况下的网络产品定价问题,从市场势力、税收政策、转移支付、规制收买等角度解释了主导性企业和接入企业在不同状态下的产品定价策略,同时讨论规制收买产生的影子成本对企业收益、社会福利的影响。 The pricing of the network industry with the properties of natural monopoly, such as telecommunications, electricity and railways, has a bearing on national economy and people’s livelihood. This paper establishes a model of incentive regulation under “double principal-agent ” system, analyzes the problem of network product pricing under the condition of information asymmetry and regulatory buy-out, explains from the perspective of market power, tax policy, transfer payment and regulation buyout The pricing strategies of the dominant enterprises and access enterprises in different states are also discussed. At the same time, the influence of the shadow costs arising from regulation purchase on corporate income and social welfare is discussed.